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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ELAINE CROFTS,
Plaintiff and .Appellant,
-vs.-

No. 8440

W. GLENN JOHNSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This is an appeal front a judgn1ent of the District
Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Kane County
entered September 26, 1955. The plaintiff and appellant
claiming under an auditor's tax deed from Kane County
filed suit against the defendant and respondent to quiet
plaintiff's title to a home and lot in Kanab. The defendant and respondent, the former owner of the property,
answered and asked the court to declare the plaintiff's
title to be held in trust for him. The court found the
issues in favor of the defendant and respondent and
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entered judgment requiring the plaintiff and appellant
to convey her title to the defendant and respondent upon
reimbursement for the amount she paid for the tax deed
with interest.
No question was raised as to the validity and regularity of the assessment and tax sale proceedings either
in the pleadings or at the trial. The sole issue both in
the trial court and on appeal concerns the standing of
the plaintiff and appellant to assert her tax title against
the defendant and respondent. For the sake of brevity
the plaintiff and appellant will hereinafter be referred
to as the appellant and the defendant and respondent
will be referred to as the respondent.
The facts are almost entirely undisputed and the
essential ones are here briefly set forth. On April 23,
1946, the respondent (and his now deceased wife) mortgaged the premises in question to the St. George Building
Society, St. George, Utah, for the sum of $2150.00. The
property is described as follows :
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Lot 3,
Block 3, Plat "A" of the official survey of Kanab
Townsite, and running thence East 10 rods;
thence North 5 rods ; thence ''Test 10 rods ; thence
South 5 rods to the place of beginning, containing 50 square rods be the same more or less, together with all improve1nents located thereon and
all appurtenances thereunto appertaining.
The respondent resided in J{anab on the premises
until the latter part of 1949 at "~hieh time he left Kane
County and rented the property to tenants. On October
27, 1950, the St. George Building Society assigned the
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respondent's note and Inortgage to Willia1n J. ~fackel
prang, the father of the appellant. J\ilackelprang gave
the Building Society his note and n1ortgage on different
property as consideration for the assignment, and the
appellant paid the Building Society the amount of the
Mackelprang note over a period of three or four years
(R. 37,80 and 81). The appellant paid the Building
Society approximately $2300.00 plus interest (R. 80).
The respondent was in default under his mortgage at
the time of the assignment to ~iackelprang (R. 47).
General taxes for the years 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 were
unpaid at the time of the assignment. Under the ter1ns
of the note. and mortgage to the Building Society the
mortgagee was not obligated to pay taxes on the mortgaged property (see exhibits A and B to complaints in
Kane County civil files No. 23 and No . 72).
On November 1, 1950, Mackelprang filed a mortgage
foreclosure complaint against the respondent in Kane
County. The sheriff was unable to locate the ·respondent to serve sum1nons on hin1 (R. 70) and the action
abated for failure to obtain service within one year
after the filing of the complaint (Kane County Civil
No. 23). The tenants moved off the property on December 13, 1950. Prior to December 13th 1fackelprang
caused an eviction notice to be served on the tenants
(R. 57). Prior to the time the tenants moved the appellant telephoned Mrs. Young, one of the tenants, and
told her that she (appellant) and her husband were buying the property and asked when the tenants "vere going
to move (R. 56-7). The appellant and her husband took
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possession of the premises December 24, 1950, and have
been in continuous possession ever since (R. 34). When
appellant took occupancy of the property she did so
with the intent of and for the purpose of buying title
to the property (R. 81). Mackelprang comn1enced his
mortgage foreclosure action against the respondent in
1950 for the purpose of foreclosing and securing clear
title to the property (R. 67), and quite obviously for the
further purpose of conveying his title to his daughter,
the appellant. Appellant made improvements to make
the property livable before moving in and continued to
make improvements both before and after she bought
the tax title in 1fay 1952 (R. 82). At the May Sale in
1952 Mackelprang bid the property on behalf of appellant
and appellant paid Kane County $262.45 for a tax deed
(R. 64, 87). The property was sold by the county for
delinquent taxes, penalties, interest and costs for the
years 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951 (R. 88), the May
Sale being based on the expiration of the period of redemption for the delinquent 1947 taxes. The tax deed
the appellant received in !:fay 1952 'vas defective in form
(R. 71), and a corrected auditor's tax deed was issued
to the appellant by Kane County on August 14, 1954
(R. 87 Exhibit No.1).
In October 1953 ~fackelprang conunenced a second
mortgage foreclosure action against the respondent,
which is still pending, although if the appellant's tax
title is good the 1nortgage lien has been extinguished.
Service of sum1nons on the respondent \vas obtained in
this second foreclosure proceeding. Respondent had no
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knowledge of Mackelprang's unsuccessful attempt to
institute foreclosure proceedings in 1950 (R. 45), but
he did hear that his tenants had been 1noved out (R. 45).
From the time respondent's tenants 1noved until October,
1.953, when he was served with sum1nons in the second
foreclosure action, respondent thought that the Building
Society had obtained title to the property and that he had
no interest in it (R. 51-2). Fro1n Dece1nber 1950 until
October 1953 respondent made no inquiry at the l{ane
County courthouse, the St. George Building Society, the
appellant or her father concerning the property (R.
51-2), and neither paid nor attempted to pay taxes or
mortgage payments.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE TRIAL
COURT COULD PROPERLY FIND THAT THE APPELLANT
OWED A DUTY TO THE RESPONDENT WHICH WOULD
DISQUALIFY HER FROM PURCHASING A TAX TITLE,
AND THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
APPELLANT A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEE OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE RESPONDENT AND
REQUIRING HER TO CONVEY HER TITLE TO THE RESPONDENT.

ARGUMENT
1. APPELLANT TOOK ADVERSE AND HOSTILE POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SUBSEQUENT TO THE
LEVY OF THE TAXES FOR WHICH 'THE PROPERTY WAS
SOLD AND WAS ENTITLED TO PURCHASE A TAX TITLE.
2. APPELLANT WAS NOT IN THE POSITION OF A
MORTGAGEE AND NOT SUBJECT TO ANY INFIRMITIES
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WHICH MIGHT ATTACH TO A MORTGAGEE REGARDING
PURCHASE OF A TAX TITLE.
3. EVEN ASSUMING APPELLANT WAS IN THE POSITION OF A MORTGAGEE, SHE WAS ENTITLED TO PURCHASE A T·AX TITLE UNDER THE FACTS OF 'THIS CASE.

POINT 1 OF ARGUI\1ENT
The general law is that any person not under a legal
or moral duty to pay taxes on real estate may purchase
a tax title and assert it against the world. 85 C.J.S.
Taxation Sec. 809 (a), 51 Am. Jur. Taxation Sec. 1053.
In this case the trial court made no finding or conclusion
that the appellant was under any legal or moral duty
to pay taxes on the property in dispute.
The appellant took possession of the property in
December 1950 at which tin1e the taxes for the years
1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 were already past due and
delinquent. Appellant was in no way obligated to pay
these past due taxes. Paragraph 3 of the respondent's
Answer (R. 8), the court's finding of fact No. 6 (R. 11)
and the appellant's testimony that she told the tenants
she was buying the property (R. 56-7) taken together
with the respondent's testin1ony that he thought the
Building Society had got hold of the property and he
was out (R. 51-2) n1ake it very c.lear that appellant's possession was hostile to any clailn of respondent and so
understood by hhn. Under these circun1stanees there
could be no duty upon the appellant to pay back taxes
on the property. R.espondent had no reason whatever
to expect appellant to pay his baek taxes and by his own
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testimony had no such expectation. His total failure
to make any inquiry concerning his property for three
years after his tenants moved or to n1ake any effort to
pay taxes or mortgage payrnents cornpels the conclusion
that he simply abandoned the property rather than to
face his tax and n1ortgage obligations. The appellant
contends that her taking of possession under the circumstances of this case in no way disqualified her from purchasing a tax title and that she stood in the same position towards the respondent as a complete stranger to
the property. It i~ the general rule that neither mere
possession nor possession under which the possessor
has or claims an interest will disqualify him from buying
a tax title, provided he was under no obligation to pay
the taxes for which the property was sold. 85 C.J.S.
Taxation, Sec. 809 (a); 51 Am. Jur. Taxation, Sec. 1053.
This rule applies to the appellant in this case and the
lower court should have affirmed her tax title.

POINT 2 OF ARGUMENT
Assuming, but not conceding, that appellant's father,
Mackelprang, as a mortgagee, was under a duty to pay
taxes on the property and therefore disabled from buying a tax title, there is no reason for placing appellant
in the same category. Mere relationship of child to
parent who has a duty to pay taxes is insufficient to
transfer that duty to the child. A Utah case and a recent
Oklahorna case both approve the acquisition of a tax
title by a child under these circumstances. Deseret Ir-
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rigation Company v. Bishop, 92 Utah 220, 67 Pacific
2nd 210; Crane v. Taylor, 261 Pacific 2nd 587.
As noted before in this brief, appellant's action in
taking possession and making improvements was in complete hostility to any claim or interest of the respondent
in the property and so understood by him .. Appellant
was not an assignee of the 1nortgage and took no part in
any foreclosure proceedings. She could not have paid
the taxes and then claimed a lien. The only link between
appellant and Mackelprang, her father, is that she paid
his note to the Building Society given as consideration
for the assignment of the mortgage. The record is very
clear that she did this with the intent of and for the
purpose of buying title to the property and not to acquire
any interest in the mortgage. The fact that ~fackelprang
failed to foreclose the mortgage and secure title he could
convey to her does not change her position from that
of a purchaser to that of a mortgagee. The trial court
made no finding or conclusion to the effect that appellant was in the position of a n1ortgagee and she should
not be considered as such.
POINT 3 OF

ARGU~fENT

Even assuming that appellant could properly be
regarded as a mortgagee in this case, nevertheless under
the facts disclosed by the record she 'vas not disqualified
from purchasing a tax title and asserting it against the
respondent. The 1nere existence of a Inortgagee-Inortgagor relationship does not disable the n1ort.gagee from
purchasing a tax title to the n1ortgaged pren1ises. The

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

Utah statutes expressly give a 111ortgagee the right to
take an assignment of the county's interest under a
preliminary tax sale certificate, and, in the absence of a
redemption, to acquire a tax deed from the county. Sec'""
tions 59-10-37 and 59-10-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Without benefit of this statute this court has upheld
the right of a mortgagee to purchase a tax title and
claiming under it to successfully interpose the statute of
limitations against the mortgagor. Baker v. Goodn1an,
57 Utah 349, 194 Pac 117. Oklahorna has likewise approved the purchase of a tax title by a mortgagee. Stith
v. Gidney, 141 Pacific 2nd 1003. The Utah case Hadlock v. Benjamin Drainage District, 89 Utah 94, 53
Pacific 2nd 1156, seems at first glance to hold that a
mortgagee cannot purchase a tax title, but in the writer's
opinion that case can be clearly distinguished from the
case at bar. In the Hadlock case a mortgagee who subsequently took a quit claim deed fro1n the mortgagor
in satisfaction of the mortgage and who also purchased
a tax title from the county was not permitted to ass.ert
his tax title against the tax lien of the drainage district.
As stated in the opinion of the Chief Justice the decision was based partly on Laws of Utah 1921, chap. 140,
p. 384, R. S. Utah, 1933, 80-10-68, which permitted a
redemption after the period of redemption had expired
but before sale. This provision of the law was eliminated
by Laws of Utah, 1933, chap. 62. The majority opinion
also laid emphasis on the fact that the tax title was being
asserted against the drainage district, a governmental
unit with power to levy taxes and create a lien on
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real estate in the district. The majority opinion held that
the mortgagee as 'vell as the mortgagor had a duty to pay
the drainage district taxes and that neither could acquire
a tax title and assert it against the lien of the drainage
district. In this case the appellant, even considered
as a mortgagee, had no duty of any kind to pay back
taxes on behalf of the former owner who had abandoned
the property. This case does not involve a governmental
taxing unit. The question of a redemption under a now
repealed statute is not an issue in this case. The dissenting opinion of Justice Wolfe in the Hadlock case
points out that estoppel is the basis of the rule prohibiting a person under a duty to pay taxes from
purchasing a tax title. If there is no duty to pay taxes
there can be no estoppel. Justice Folland in his dissenting opinion points out that the Hadley decision fails to
give any effect to the Utah statute expressly authorizing
the purchase of a tax title by a mortgagee. Laws of
Utah, 1919, chap. 122, no'v 59-10-37, lT.C.A., 1953, and
59-10-62, U.C.A., 1953. In the opinion of the writer the
dissenting opinions in the Hadley case are the law of
this case both b~cause of their greater 1nerit and because
the two cases can be distinguished.
If appellant is considered as a 1nortgagee, the only
possible basis for ilnpressing her "Tith a duty to pay
taxes would have to stein fro1n her possession of the
property. As stated above the respondent's n1ortgage
to the Building Society did not obligate the n1ortgagee
to pay the taxes. If appellant had taken possession under
circu1nstances that would entitle respondent to look to
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her for the pay1nent of taxes then she might be under
an infirmity to purchase a tax title. No doubt this in.;.
firmity would attach had the appellant been in possession with the consent of the respondent and in a capacity
as mortgagee. On the contrary, however, the appellant
took possession vvithout the consent of respondent,
against his will and in total and complete repudiation of
a mortgagee status. The respondent understood the
hostile character of appellant's possession and at no
time expected her to pay his taxes. Under these facts,
which are not in dispute, how could the appellant be
under any duty to pay the back taxes on the property¥
Where is there any basis for an estoppel against the
appellant~ There is none, and whether considered as a
mortgagee or not the appellant was entitled to purchase
a tax title and assert it against the respondent under
the facts of this case.

SUM~IARY

AND CONCLUSION

In preparing this brief the writer has been confronted with the awkward problem of assailing the
validity of a judgment whose supposedly supporting
findings and conclusions give not one hint as to the
legal theory or reasoning behind it. There is no suggestion as to what facts, if any, might give rise to a duty
to pay taxes on the part of the appellant or might give
rise to a fiduciary relationship between appellant and
respondent. The lovver court n1erely stated the bald and
ultimate conclusion that the appellant held her tax title
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In trust for the respondent without bothering to give
any reason whatever as to why this was so.
Having no idea of the basis, if any, for the lower
court's decision the writer has attempted to explore the
possibilities even remotely suggested by the record and
to show that the respondent failed to prove that there is
any reason for impressing the appellant's tax title with a
constructive trust for the benefit of the respondent. The
judgment of the lower court should be set aside and
judgment entered quieting the appellant's title against
~he respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID F. ANDERSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
623 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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